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Humans interact with animals in numerous ways and on numerous levels. We are indeed 
living in an “animal”s world,’ in the sense that our lives are very much intertwined with the 
lives of animals. This also means that animals, like those dogs we commonly refer to as 
our pets, are living in a “human’s world” in the sense that it is us, not them, who, to a 
large degree, define and manage the interactions we have with them. In this sense, the 
human-animal relationship is nothing we should romanticize: it comes with clear power 
relations and thus with a set of responsibilities on the side of those who exercise this 
power. This holds, despite the fact that we like to think about our dogs as human’s best 
friend. Dogs have been part of human societies for longer than any other domestic species. 
Like no other species they exemplify the role of companion animals. Relationships with 
pet dogs are both very widespread and very intense, often leading to strong attachments 
between owners or caregivers and animals and to a treatment of these dogs as family 
members or even children. But how does this relationship look from the dogs’ perspective? 
How do they perceive the humans they engage with? What responsibilities and duties 
arise from the kind of mutual understanding, attachment, and the supposedly “special” 
bonds we form with them? Are there ethical implications, maybe even ethical implications 
beyond animal welfare? The past decades have seen an upsurge of research from 
comparative cognition on pet dogs’ cognitive and social skills, especially in comparison 
with and reference to humans. We will therefore set our discussion about the nature and 
ethical dimensions of the human–dog relationship against the background of the current 
empirical knowledge on dog (social) cognition. This allows us to analyze the human–dog 
relationship by applying an interdisciplinary approach that starts from the perspective of 
the dog to ultimately inform the perspective of humans. It is our aim to thereby identify 
ethical dimensions of the human–dog relationship that have been overlooked so far.
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INTRODUCTION
The question of how dogs perceive us humans is important 
for several reasons, both from the perspective of biologists as 
well as animal ethicists. First, an enduring topic of animal 
behavior and animal cognition research is how animals adapt 
to their social environment, how they cope with the challenges 
of dynamic relationships among group members, and especially 
how they achieve a balance between competition and cooperation. 
Complex social life has been proposed as one of the main 
driving forces in the evolution of higher cognitive abilities in 
humans and non-human animals (Humphrey, 1976; Dunbar, 1998).
Secondly, while evolution has equipped species with the 
appropriate cognitive tools to engage in sophisticated social 
interactions during foraging and conflict management, including 
the formation of valuable relationships (social bonds), it is less 
clear how species became able to deal with heterospecifics with 
whom they live in close interaction, i.e., not simply as prey or 
predator. This is the case in at least two domains, in urban 
species and in domesticated species. In the latter domain, dogs 
have been considered as the species that formed the closest 
bonds with humans. So how was it possible for these animals 
to engage in such close interactions with humans, who are 
members of a different species, with a different anatomy, physiology, 
including different sensory modalities, behavior, and cognition?
While the first two reasons might inspire cognitive biologists 
who address topics in animal behavior and evolution to investigate 
dogs’ perspective on the human–dog-relationship, animal ethicists 
might find additional reasons why the question of how dogs 
perceive humans is important. This is because the relationship 
between humans and dogs is characterized by a clear dominance 
hierarchy, not only during the process of domestication, but 
also during the individual life of the dog. This only gives us 
an ethical reason why to consider the human–dog-relationship 
but also a reason why to consider it differently than relationships 
that are not characterized in such a way. Humans have 
domesticated dogs, not vice versa, mainly to exploit them for 
their own benefit, as assistants during hunting, as guardians 
of their homes, or as companions. More recently, we have added 
other tasks and purposes that cover a very wide range of 
different contexts. We  use dogs as testing devices in labs, as 
search (and rescue) animals (when looking for missing persons 
as much as when looking for rare truffles), as therapists in 
animal-assisted therapies, dance partners in dog dancing, hair 
models in dog grooming, or influencers in social media, just 
to name a few. The multitude of interactions and contexts in 
which we  use them, of course, has produced a number of 
welfare issues and, as we  are going to argue, ethical issues 
beyond welfare. While ethical debates have convincingly pointed 
to human responsibilities for example in the case of farm animals 
and lab animals, companion animals are often not so clearly 
seen as animals which we  “use,” objectify, or instrumentalize, 
maybe because the term “companion” indicates to some degree 
a mutual relationship rather than an exploitative one. But how, 
in fact, do dogs experience this relationship? How do they 
perceive the humans they engage with? Have they indeed 
specifically adapted to interact and form “special” bonds with 
humans as the Domestication Hypothesis (see our section on 
Effects of Domestication) suggests? We  assume that part of the 
answer to these questions can be found in the growing evidence 
for dogs’ special skills to perceive and understand us.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In a first step, we will 
discuss insights from the dog’s domestication history and from 
empirical studies on their (social) cognition to illustrate how 
dogs perceive us, and consequently sketch the nature of our 
relationship with them. In a second step, we  will assess what 
ethical responsibilities arise from the characteristics of the human–
dog relationship. Should we  profoundly reevaluate some ways 
we  use dogs, and enrich the narrative of dogs as “companions” 
and “man’s best friend” with some ethical considerations that 
are indeed more demanding? Our methodology thus utilizes 
the results from current debates in dog social cognition to evaluate 
the human–dog relationship from a critical, ethical perspective. 
Our aim is to show by means of such an interdisciplinary 
investigation in what ways our current knowledge about dog 
domestication and dog social cognition can and should inform 
our treatment of these animals. For our discussion of the empirical 
evidence, we  have picked three areas of dog social cognition 
where we  find a substantial amount of studies. Our selection 
thus mirrors the general interest of the research community. 
However, the community might be  neglecting other possible 
abilities in dogs due to a lack of interest in them, a publication 
bias towards positive results, flawed study designs or other reasons. 
We  will come back to this in our ethical discussion, since what 
we  do not know about dogs might be  relevant to the treatment 
that we  owe them. While in this paper we  will restrict our 
discussion of ethical implications to the kinds of studies available, 
other, more profound ethical implications might lie ahead, once 
cognition research broadens its focus.
CHARACTERIZING THE HUMAN–DOG 
RELATIONSHIP: BIOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES
In this section, we  will investigate the characteristics of the 
human–dog relationship by following the decisive question of 
how dogs adapt to the human environment. We  will turn our 
attention to the latest research results from the fields of animal 
cognition and behavior. The default assumption is that dogs’ 
skills are firmly based on some general canine abilities of 
intraspecies communication plus a combination of phylogenetic 
and ontogenetic abilities of interspecies communication. The 
latter ones have emerged from domestication and individual 
social and cognitive development (Huber, 2016). Both kinds 
of developmental factors have contributed to the success of 
dogs living among and with humans, including their adoption 
of the numerous roles humans give to them.
Effects of Domestication: New Skills or 
Special Sensitivity?
For thousands of years humans have changed the morphology, 
physiology, and behavior of dogs through selective breeding. 
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Canines were the earliest domesticated animal, a process that 
started somewhere between 15,000 and 30,000  years ago, most 
likely when gray wolves began scavenging around human 
settlements. Dog experts differ on how active role humans 
played in the next step, but eventually the relationship became 
a mutual one, as we began employing dogs for hunting, guarding, 
and companionship.1
It is, however, still an open question to what extent the 
three kinds of cognitive and communicative adaptations – of 
the wolf, the dog, and the human companion (pet) – contribute 
to this extraordinary achievement. It is furthermore disputable 
if the outcome of these different developments is a new skill 
or rather a special sensitivity. In addition, we  may distinguish 
not only between phylogenetic and ontogenetic routes, but 
also between construction and inflection (Heyes, 2003), to 
overcome the simplistic dichotomy of nature vs. nurture. One 
cautionary application of the multiple routes framework would 
be  to assume that dogs have acquired a special sensitivity 
towards human gestures, speech, and behavior as a phylogenetic 
inflection through human selection over many thousands of 
years. This sensitivity is not a new cognitive or sensory 
mechanism, but the result of a selection biasing the input.
Since the time dogs became a special focus of ethology 
and comparative cognition research, the so-called Domestication 
Hypothesis has dominated the debate about the special skills 
of dogs (Hare et  al., 2002; Topál et  al., 2009; Miklósi and 
Topál, 2013). It has been assumed that dogs have been selected 
to cooperate and communicate with humans during domestication 
and, thus, evolved some genetic predispositions allowing them 
to develop skills shared with humans. Accordingly, it has been 
suggested that, in a unique way, domestication has equipped 
dogs with two abilities necessary for cooperative problem 
solving – namely social tolerance and social attentiveness, which 
enable them to adjust their behavior to that of their human 
partners (Ostojic and Clayton, 2014).
Empirical support for the Domestication Hypothesis has 
been sought by comparing dogs and wolves. Several of the 
early comparisons have indeed found profound differences 
between domesticated forms and their wild ancestors (i.e., the 
closest wild-living relatives) in the way they communicate and 
cooperate with humans, for instance in following human gestures, 
as well as in their capacities for social tolerance and social 
attentiveness. It has been proposed that dogs have been selected 
for tamer temperament and for reduced fear and aggression, 
which allows a potential partner to come close even around 
food, which in turn explains the higher success of dogs in 
cooperative and communicative interactions with humans in 
comparison to wolves (Hare and Tomasello, 2005).
Apart from social tolerance, cooperation with humans and 
learning from humans are facilitated by a high degree of social 
attentiveness. Cooperation requires that the partners pay sufficient 
1 There is the possibility that dogs “domesticated themselves” to exploit a niche 
associated with the anthropogenic environment. However, given humans’ interest 
in domesticating (and then breeding and keeping) all sorts of species for their 
purposes we  find it hard to believe that in dogs it was a one-sided process 
with all agency ranging on the dog’s side.
attention to each other in order to adjust or synchronize their 
behavior, and social learning requires paying attention to the 
demonstrator’s actions and the context in which they are executed 
(Huber et  al., 2009). Attentiveness towards potential partners 
varies not only according to the tasks, but at least in the 
human–dog case, it crucially depends on the relationship between 
the partners (Range et  al., 2007; Horn et  al., 2013). Dogs have 
proven successful in several tasks that are thought to require 
high attention towards humans, such as experiments on social 
learning (Kubinyi et  al., 2003; Topál et  al., 2006; Huber et  al., 
2009, 2014; Range et  al., 2011; Fugazza and Miklósi, 2014), 
social referencing (Merola et  al., 2012a,b), communication 
(Virányi et al., 2004; Schwab and Huber, 2006; Udell and Wynne, 
2008; Dorey et  al., 2009; Kaminski et  al., 2012), responding 
to unequal rewards (Range et  al., 2009), and cooperation 
(Naderi et al., 2001; Bräuer et al., 2013; Ostojic and Clayton, 2014).
Another line of evidence for the differences between dogs 
and wolves comes from pointing studies. Young dogs follow 
human pointing better and look at humans more readily than 
human-raised wolves (Miklósi et  al., 2003; Gácsi et  al., 2009). 
This led researchers to propose that dogs have developed increased 
social attentiveness compared to wolves and, thus, can achieve 
more complex forms of dog–human communication and 
cooperation than wolves (Miklósi et al., 2003; Virányi et al., 2008).
However, as most of the studies compared the animals’ 
interactions only with humans (Hare et al., 2002; Miklósi et al., 
2003; Topál et al., 2005; Udell and Wynne, 2008; Virányi et al., 
2008; Gácsi et al., 2009; Udell et al., 2011), it remained unclear 
whether the differences between dogs and wolves reflect mere 
differences in the readiness of dogs and wolves to interact 
with humans or more fundamental differences regarding 
intraspecific cooperation. Indeed, experiments at the Wolf 
Science Center in Austria have shown that (hand-raised) wolves 
pay as much attention to human partners as dogs do and 
that these wolves can even outperform dogs in learning from 
observation of a conspecific, indicating the high social 
attentiveness of the species (Range and Virányi, 2013, 2014). 
Accordingly, the so-called Canine Cooperation Hypothesis 
postulates that dog-human cooperation evolved on the basis 
of wolf–wolf cooperation and that no additional selection for 
social attentiveness and tolerance was necessary to allow for 
dog-human cooperation to evolve (Range and Virányi, 2014, 
2015; Virányi and Range, 2014). Rather than tolerance, 
domestication may have led to reduced fear of humans, which 
is supported by the fact that dogs need less intensive socialization 
than wolves to avoid fear of humans (Scott and Fuller, 1965; 
Klinghammer and Goodmann, 1987). If dogs are less fearful 
of humans and more comfortable around them than wolves, 
they would have gained advantages from witnessing human 
actions (even without being more attentive), and from sooner 
engaging in interactions with humans.
According to the Canine Cooperation Hypothesis, the high 
social attentiveness, tolerance, and presumable cooperativeness 
of wolves provided a good basis for dog–human cooperation 
to evolve during domestication. In addition, some relevant 
features in sociability and cooperativeness are shared by wolves 
and humans and thus have probably facilitated the domestication 
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of dogs (Clutton-Brock, 1984; Schleidt, 1998). However, dogs 
are not only specifically sensitive to humans because of the 
domestication history of their species and the evolutionary 
baggage that has been passed down to them from their wild 
ancestors, the wolves. They are also what they are because 
each of them trains their outstanding sensitivity towards humans 
on an individual, ontogenetic level.
Individual Development
Despite being equipped by evolution with skills and propensities 
to adapt to humans by showing high levels of social tolerance 
and attentiveness, dogs need to individually learn much about 
their heterospecific partners in order to establish and maintain 
firm individualized relationships. During their life in the human 
household as pets or companions, they have ample opportunities 
to do so. Family dogs live in close day-to-day contact with 
humans and can therefore collect an enormous amount of 
experience. Research from the last decades has sought to 
understand how dogs perceive elements of their environment, 
learn about it, and use this knowledge to make informed decisions 
about proper behavior (Huber, 2016). Their skills in face processing, 
behavior reading, observational learning, and perspective taking 
play a crucial role here (for reviews, see Bensky et  al., 2013; 
Kaminski and Marshall-Pescini, 2014; Lea and Osthaus, 2018). 
In what follows, we  will summarize recent findings on dogs’ 
understanding of human emotions, gestures, and actions.
Understanding Human Emotions: How Dogs Read 
Our Faces and Listen to Our Voices
Interspecies emotional communication is in part facilitated by 
chemosignals (D’Aniello et  al., 2018), but, faces are in addition 
an important visual category for many species because they 
provide a rich source of perceptual cues, including many 
idiosyncratic features, and thus facilitate important discriminations. 
In the specific case of dogs, it has been suggested that their 
increased readiness to look at the human face provides a basis 
for complex forms of dog-human communication (Miklósi et al., 
2003). By monitoring human faces, dogs seem to obtain important 
social information, ranging from communicative gestures to 
attentive states (Schwab and Huber, 2006; Kaminski and Nitzschner, 
2013). Dogs can quickly find out what features are relevant or 
informative for making important decisions. They also 
spontaneously focus on the eyes to infer where humans attend, 
what they are interested in, and even what they intend to do 
next (see eye movement studies like for example Somppi et al., 2014).
Gaze following is present in many species, but dogs outperform 
even nonhuman primates in following human gaze in object 
choice tasks (Hare et  al., 2002; Cooper et  al., 2003). Like in 
the case of human infants, their gaze following is modulated 
by ostensive cueing, such as direct gaze and addressing by 
the person, which is evidence that it is more than simply a 
product of reflexive and learnt mechanisms (Téglás et al., 2012). 
Dogs also follow human’s gaze into distant space (Wallis et  al., 
2015), and they use the eyes of humans to judge their attentional 
state. In one study, dogs were tempted with sausages but told 
by the caregiver not to take them. The dogs obeyed more or 
less depending on the caregiver’s attention to them (Schwab 
and Huber, 2006). When being watched by the caregiver, dogs 
stayed lying down most often or for the longest time, but 
when the caregiver read a book, watched TV, turned her back 
on them, or left the room, their patience ceased. Obviously, 
they were using eye contact and eye orientation as cues.
Human faces provide much more information than simply 
looking patterns. A great number of idiosyncratic features allow 
humans to identify and recognize others. Would dogs also 
profit from this rich source of information? Could they also 
identify and recognize their caregiver and other familiar humans? 
In one study we  put these questions to test and asked dogs 
to discriminate between their caregiver and another highly 
familiar person by active choice (approaching and touching; 
Huber et  al., 2013). The task could not simply be  solved on 
the basis of familiarity (approaching the familiar person), which 
is considered an easier task (Wilkinson et al., 2010), but required 
a fine-grained distinction of familiar people. Dogs could do 
so, even when they saw only the (real) face of the humans, 
but had difficulties when the face was only projected as a 
picture to a big screen. Only a minority of dogs could finally 
identify the caregiver on face pictures in which the outer parts 
of their faces were occluded with a balaclava hood. A further 
study confirmed the importance of human eyes for dogs, 
because they rely less on the nose or the mouth than on the 
eyes for human face discrimination (Pitteri et  al., 2014). They 
also prefer looking at upright over inverted faces, exactly as 
we  ourselves do (Somppi et  al., 2012, 2014).
On the basis of our findings that dogs are competent enough 
to extract subtle, idiosyncratic features of a face in order to 
identify a human person, despite changes of color, hair style, 
make-up, jewelry, hats, etc., we  went one step further and 
asked whether dogs may also learn from our facial expressions. 
It has been already shown that dogs can rely on human facial 
expressions when making decisions about approaching other 
objects (Merola et  al., 2012a). However, a study in which the 
stimuli were photographs showing human faces with two 
different emotional expressions did not yield conclusive results 
(Nagasawa et al., 2011). Although dogs learned to discriminate 
between happy (smiling) faces and neutral faces of their caregiver 
and subsequently transferred the contingency to novel faces 
of unfamiliar people, it is not clear whether the dogs simply 
used a salient discriminatory cue, such as the visibility of 
teeth in the happy faces, to solve both the discrimination and 
the generalization task.
In the Clever Dog Lab in Vienna, we  asked dogs to 
discriminate “hemifaces” – either the lower or the upper half 
of the faces – of women showing different (happy and angry) 
emotions. With this trick we  could investigate whether dogs 
solve the task solely by attending to the emotional expression 
rather than any inadvertent cues in the presented human face 
(Müller et  al., 2015). Given that the simple discriminatory 
cues in one half of the faces – such as teeth in the lower 
half – were absent in the other half, the authors could test 
the dogs’ ability to spontaneously categorize novel pictures on 
the sole basis of the emotional expression, provided globally 
and not just by local cues. Indeed, the dogs did not only 
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manage to learn the training task, but they were also able to 
transfer the extracted rule to novel faces, even if they had 
been presented a hemiface not shown in training.
These findings provide strong evidence that dogs are able 
to discriminate between emotional expressions in a different 
species, which, compared to emotion recognition in conspecifics, 
is particularly challenging (cf. Parr et  al., 2008). For instance, 
humans open their mouth and show their teeth while laughing, 
whereas dogs express the underlying emotions of aggression 
by showing their teeth. Therefore, dogs cannot rely on genetic 
predispositions, but need to individually learn the emotional 
expressions of humans. The fact that dogs could spontaneously 
generalize from one face half to the other without the possibility 
to use cues learned during training strongly supports the idea 
that they remembered something from their daily experiences 
with their caregiver or other familiar people and then used 
this information in the artificial laboratory environment. As 
they had not been explicitly trained, it seems that they had 
acquired the competence by latent learning.
Humans express their emotions not only visually but also 
their voices convey information about affects. Dogs may exploit 
these contingencies by extracting and integrating bimodal 
sensory emotional information from humans. From the 
combination of visual and auditory cues they may form 
multimodal representations. Using a cross-modal preferential 
looking paradigm, researchers at the University of Lincoln 
(United Kingdom) managed to show that dogs spontaneously 
combine human or dog faces with different emotional valences 
(happy/playful versus angry/aggressive) with a single vocalization 
from the same individual of the same positive or negative 
valence (Albuquerque et  al., 2016). This result points to the 
possibility that dogs recognized or understood the emotional 
content of the human faces, not just discriminated them 
perceptually. Recent eye-tracking studies have supported this 
hypothesis (Barber et  al., 2016; Somppi et  al., 2016).
The ability of dogs to integrate information of humans across 
modalities has also been investigated by using the expectancy-
violation procedure (Adachi et  al., 2007). A photograph of 
either the caregiver’s face or an unfamiliar person’s face was 
presented to the dog after a vocalization was played. The 
vocalization used was from the same person or another person, 
thus matched or mismatched the image. According to the 
expectancy-violation logic, dogs should be  surprised if the 
visual and auditory cues mismatch and thus look longer than 
when the two cues match. This is what happened. After hearing 
the caregiver’s voice when the face of an unfamiliar person 
appeared (incongruent condition), dogs exhibited extended 
looking, while in the case when the vocalization and face 
matched (i.e., came from the same person; congruent condition), 
the duration of their gaze was comparably briefer. These findings 
lend support to the hypothesis that dogs recall their caregiver’s 
face upon hearing the caregiver’s voice.
Taken together, there is cumulating evidence that dogs obtain 
social information from their experiences with humans, specifically 
from their facial expressions. They can recognize and remember 
individual humans. They understand to a significant degree 
what these humans attend to, what they are interested in, and 
what they intend to do next. They can discriminate, individually 
learn from, and categorize emotional expressions, and they 
integrate information coming from vocalizations into their 
understanding of humans and their emotions. Thus, they form 
multi-modal representations of humans and their emotions, 
integrating emotions, facial expressions, and vocalizations.
Understanding Human Gestures: How Dogs Learn 
to Cooperate
Due to domestication programs that had the goal of producing 
companions that work with or for humans, and thereby follow 
human commands, dogs may have acquired a special sensitivity 
to human gestures, speech, and behavior (Miklósi and Topál, 
2013). Neither the chimpanzee, humans’ closest living relative, 
nor the wolf, dogs’ closest living relative, can understand and 
use human communicative cues as flexibly as the domestic 
dog (Kaminski and Nitzschner, 2013). This kind of phylogenetic 
enculturation that took place over thousands of years is continued 
and amplified in the course of their lifespan, as companion 
dogs collect an enormous amount of experience during their 
life with humans (Topál et  al., 1998; Udell and Wynne, 2008, 
2010; Topál and Gácsi, 2012). A prominent example of how 
well dogs understand humans and how eager they are to 
cooperate is the behavior of assistance dogs, especially for 
leading blind people (Naderi et  al., 2001). In the latter case, 
information is not only provided but also accepted by both 
parties in the course of their joint actions. So what exactly 
do dogs learn about our behavior, especially about human 
actions that are unlikely in their species-specific action repertoire? 
An especially interesting group of actions are those that serve 
us humans to inform the dog or to guide them.
One of the best examples of dogs’ socio-cognitive skills is 
their ability to properly respond to human cues in a cooperative 
search context. Numerous studies have shown that dogs can 
reliably follow a set of basic human cues (e.g., distal/proximate 
pointing, head turns, and eye glances), as well as being adept 
at flexibly generalizing this behavior to relatively novel human 
movements (e.g., “cross-pointing,” leg pointing, gestures with 
reversed direction of movement, and different arm extensions; 
Soproni et al., 2002; Udell et al., 2008). In contrast, substituting 
the hand with a stick or preventing the dog from seeing the 
hand protruding from the body contour decreased performance, 
thereby pointing to the importance of the human’s hand. In 
addition to questions about the cognition involved in dogs’ 
responding to human cueing, experiments have flourished that 
systematically tested the contexts, the time-course, breed 
differences, training effects, and other aspects of this canine 
competence (review in Bensky et  al., 2013).
Among those actions, perhaps the best studied one is the 
human pointing gesture. First of all, pointing by humans is 
a social cue, which in general is more salient or effective than 
non- social cues like visual markers in terms of signaling the 
location of something important, like food (Agnetta et  al., 
2000; Udell et  al., 2008). In sharp contrast to apes (Herrmann 
and Tomasello, 2006), this ability to use human cues by dogs 
is more effective in cooperative contexts (Wobber and Hare, 2009) 
than in competitive ones (Pettersson et  al., 2011).
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Although so far there is no consensus among researchers 
about when exactly dogs become competent at understanding 
the pointing gesture (e.g., Dorey et  al., 2010), it is obvious 
that individual learning is very effective. Even hand-raised adult 
wolves are as successful in relying on distal momentary pointing 
as adult pet dogs (Gácsi et  al., 2009). Still, positive feedback 
processes (both evolutionary and epigenetic) have increased 
the readiness of dogs to attend to humans, providing the basis 
for dog-human communication. Among dogs, breeds that have 
been historically bred for working purposes respond to human 
pointing cues significantly more than breeds that have been 
bred for companionship (Wobber and Kaminski, 2011), and 
breeds that were originally bred for cooperative work (e.g., 
herding) performed better than those that were bred for 
independent work (e.g., guarding; Gácsi et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
those with a special training for responding to cues from a 
distance, like working-gun dogs, utilized a pointing cue 
significantly more than dogs without such training (McKinley 
and Sambrook, 2000). Independent of breed differences, shelter 
dogs are less successful than pet dogs at following a distal 
momentary-pointing gesture (Udell et  al., 2008).2 Lastly, dogs’ 
future use of human cues is highly malleable depending on 
reinforcement history (Elgier et  al., 2009). All of this does not 
mean that breed differences (to the extent they exist) are either 
phylogenetic or ontogenetic – they are most likely both. We should 
keep this in mind in order to avoid the nature–nurture fallacy.
After the first wave of research on dogs’ understanding of 
human cues, the last decade has devoted work to the question 
of how subtle (and perhaps unintentional) human cues impact 
communication interactions between dogs and human (e.g., 
Kupan et  al., 2011; Kis et  al., 2012; Marshall-Pescini et  al., 
2012). Furthermore, researchers have attempted to find the key 
components or features of the human pointing gesture that 
contribute to dogs’ understanding of it as a communicative 
action. It may come as a surprise that it is still not clear 
whether dogs understand the communicative intent of the 
signaling human or whether they react only to some cuing 
that directs their attention to the reward. Earlier work showed 
that dogs are able to rely on relatively novel gestural forms of 
the human communicative pointing gesture and that they are 
able to comprehend to some extent the referential nature of 
human pointing (Soproni et al., 2002). However, recent advances 
in this research indicate that dogs do not necessarily interpret 
pointing informatively, that is, as simply providing information, 
but rather as a command, ordering them to move to a particular 
location. In one study, dogs ignored the human’s gesture if 
they had better information, and followed children’s pointing 
just as frequently as they followed adults’ pointing (and ignored 
the dishonest pointing of both), suggesting, according to the 
authors, that the amount of own knowledge but not the 
level of authority affected their behavior (Scheider et  al., 2013). 
2 We do not want to go into possible reasons for this, however, it needs to 
be  noted that a whole range of different reasons for this could exist. After 
all, a household is a very different environment than a shelter. It is possible 
that it shapes the dog’s cognitive abilities. Likewise, their abilities (or perceived 
lack of abilities) might already have been a reason why their caregivers 
abandoned them.
Both findings suggest that dogs do not see pointing as an imperative 
command but as an informative or referential cue. This does 
not mean, however, that dogs use higher levels of reasoning to 
understand the signal, the more parsimonious explanation is that 
dogs follow human pointing based on associative learning 
mechanisms, having learned in their individual ontogeny that 
the human’s pointing is often connected to rewards (e.g., Wynne 
et  al., 2008; Dorey et  al., 2010). Still, ongoing research is looking 
into the question of whether dogs react to human pointing 
gestures in acts of joint communication and shared information.
The latter account of dog’s understanding of human behavior 
is interesting with respect to the meanwhile hotly debated 
question of whether dogs, like humans (Tomasello et al., 2005), 
understand other individuals’ communicative intent based on 
some understanding of them as mental agents. Less than a 
decade ago, the majority of dog researchers were rather skeptical 
in this respect, assuming that dogs’ interpretation of referential 
behaviors is based on a fairly restricted set of cues (for instance, 
Wobber and Kaminski, 2011; Kaminski et  al., 2012). They 
were inclined to propose non-mentalistic accounts, which they 
thought would be  sufficient to explain dogs’ skills with human 
communication and enough for guiding dogs’ movements within 
space. Indeed, nothing more would be  needed to use dogs 
during certain activities like hunting and herding.
Still, the area between a completely mechanistic and a completely 
mentalistic account is huge. At the middle ground we  may see 
dogs being sensitive to humans having visual perspectives that 
are different from their own. For instance, Bräuer et  al. (2004) 
confronted dogs with a situation in which they were forbidden 
to take a piece of food. Dogs stole significantly more food if 
they could be  seen by the human, even only through a hole 
in the wall, showing that to some extent dogs seemed to be sensitive 
to the human’s visual perspective (Bräuer et  al., 2004; Kaminski 
et al., 2009). But is this sensitivity simply a result of associatively 
learning to respond to direct cues (e.g., the human can be seen), 
or can dogs infer from indirect cues what humans can or cannot 
see? The results of two recent studies indicate the second possibility. 
In a food-stealing task dogs seem to understand that, when the 
food (and therefore the area around it) is illuminated, the human 
can see them and, therefore, they refrain from approaching and 
stealing the food (Kaminski et  al., 2013). In the second study, 
dogs showed that they can understand something about a human’s 
perspective, because, out of two humans informing of where 
food was hidden, they relied on the one who could see the 
food hiding process (Maginnity and Grace, 2014). In this famous 
“Guesser–Knower task” (Povinelli et  al., 1990), dogs used cues 
directly related to the humans’ visual access to the food, like 
whether their eyes were open, whether they were directed to 
the hiding locations, and whether the informant remained in 
the room during the hiding.
Very recently we  replicated the second study, but added a 
condition in which no directly observable cues could tell the 
dogs who would be  the knower and thus reliable informant 
(Catala et  al., 2017). The critical control for behavior-reading, 
as the less demanding alternative to mind-reading, involved two 
informants that showed identical looking behavior during the 
food hiding event. However, due to their different position in 
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the room, only one had the opportunity to see where the food 
was hidden by a third person. Using geometrical gaze following, 
dogs could infer who could possibly see the food hiding, and 
whom to trust. By choosing the help of the knower but ignoring 
the help of the guesser dogs showed perspective taking.
We still have to be  careful and avoid over-interpretation. 
Geometrical gaze following, despite being seen to rest on a 
cognitively sophisticated mechanism (Fitch et  al., 2010), does 
not require mind-reading; the recognition of mental states like 
beliefs, desires, and intentions. The dogs’ confidence in the 
informant who was in the position to see the relevant event 
(food hiding) might be a product of generalization from similar 
situations in everyday life (Udell et  al., 2011). Still, even this 
does mean something: dogs seem to observe humans closely, 
form behavioral rules from this and apply them to new contexts. 
The reluctance of dogs to follow the looking-away person could 
have been learned in similar, but not identical, situations during 
their life in the human vicinity. In numerous cases they have 
seen what consequences human looking behavior has, that it 
is easier to communicate with humans whose eyes are visible 
and who look at instead of away from a target, and that they 
ignore things they have not seen before. It becomes obvious 
that living with humans puts a lot of intellectual baggage on 
the individual dog’s learning history. This means, on the other 
hand, that in order to deal with humans, dogs need opportunities 
to be  with them, observe them, and learn from situations. 
Still, more research about what dogs understand about the 
intentions and even beliefs of humans is necessary to confirm 
dogs’ recent inclusion in the small circle of models of non-human 
perspective taking in a cooperative and hetero-specific context.
Taken together, these findings show us that dogs are sensitive 
to human gestures, can learn their meaning, and seem eager 
to cooperate. They understand gestures as imperative commands 
but also to some extent as informative or referential cues, 
engaging with humans as communicative partners. Thereby, 
they do not necessarily subordinate their own perspective to 
the human one: they take their own (well-informed) knowledge 
into account when given (ill-informed) commands. Especially 
dog breeds that have been bred for cooperative work are very 
good at understanding human gestures and commands. On 
the other hand, individual training opportunities seem important: 
shelter dogs for example are less successful than pet dogs at 
following human pointing gestures. Furthermore, the dogs’ 
reinforcement history shapes their understanding of human 
gestures. Dogs have been found to be excellent behavior-readers 
if given the opportunity. They are highly competent in learning 
about directly observable but also quite subtle behavioral, gestural, 
vocal, and attentional cues, which is of high adaptive value 
for life in the human environment. In addition to their behavior-
reading competences they also seem to be  sensitive to some 
mental states in humans. They for example seem to know that 
humans have visual perspectives different from their own.
Understanding Human Actions: How Dogs Learn 
Our Social Game
Dogs have impressive capacities for social learning. This 
competence shines through in almost all forms of social learning, 
including local enhancement (e.g., Mersmann et  al., 2011), 
stimulus enhancement (e.g., Kubinyi et  al., 2003), emulation 
(e.g., Miller et  al., 2009), motor imitation (e.g., Huber et  al., 
2009), selective imitation (Range and Huber, 2007), and deferred 
imitation (e.g., Fugazza and Miklósi, 2014). They not only 
benefit from having the opportunity to learn from humans, 
they actually learn something relevant. For instance, they learn 
to make a detour to find food (Pongrácz et  al., 2001), learn 
how to manipulate objects (Kubinyi et al., 2003; Pongrácz et al., 
2012), and learn the direction in which a sliding door has 
been pushed to get some treats (Miller et al., 2009). In addition, 
they are able to anticipate the caregiver’s action, and as a 
result they synchronize their behavior with that of their caregivers 
(Kubinyi et  al., 2003; Duranton et  al., 2017). This implies that 
their learning is not only shaped by goal-directedness but 
influenced by other factors as well. This even applies to strategies 
that are seemingly unproductive or dysfunctional but nevertheless 
used by someone they observe.
Only recently it has been shown that dogs engage in what 
has been termed “overimitation,” the copying of unnecessary 
or causally irrelevant actions (Lyons et  al., 2007). This peculiar 
form of copying was until that time considered a uniquely 
human capacity, which likely played a key role in why human 
culture can accumulate over time (Clay and Tennie, 2018). It 
had been assumed that humans overimitate not only for cognitive 
and normative reasons, but also to satisfy social motivations. 
They attempt to “affiliate with or be  like the model” (Nielsen, 
2006; Keupp et  al., 2013, 393). If dogs show this behavior as 
well, it could highlight how deep they are enculturated in our 
human world because their readiness to overimitate could 
highlight their affiliation with closely bonded humans as a 
motivation for behavior.
A first study with canines provided suggestive evidence for 
overimitation (Johnston et al., 2017). In the test, the experimenter 
first established a positive relationship with the subjects by 
feeding them and then demonstrated how to open a puzzle 
box, but also performed a causally irrelevant action onto the 
box (moving a non-functional lever). Surprisingly, half of all 
tested dogs and dingoes copied both actions, although in further 
tests some stopped replicating the irrelevant action.
In two studies in the Clever Dog Lab in Vienna, the two 
actions had been separated both spatially and temporarily in 
order to ensure that the dogs did not confuse their causal 
natures (Huber et  al., 2018, 2020). The causal action consisted 
of opening a sliding door that blocked the access to a treat; 
the irrelevant action involved touching colored dots that were 
mounted on the wall at a distance. Touching the paper sheet 
had no effect and was not necessary for getting the treat. 
Despite its irrelevance, almost half of the dogs replicated the 
touching action (Huber et  al., 2018).
Before dogs had been tested on overimitation, several studies 
with great apes failed to show similar effects; they did not 
even show a tendency to copy the demonstrator’s actions that 
were not necessary to achieve a goal (e.g., Clay and Tennie, 
2018). Chimpanzees, for instance, were found to act in a purely 
goal-directed, efficient manner (Horner and Whiten, 2005). 
This led Huber et  al. (2018) to assume a social rather than a 
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cognitive explanation for overimitation in dogs. Not only their 
ability to cooperate with, but also to learn from, humans seems 
to be  closely related to their affiliative (e.g., Topál et  al., 1998) 
and communicative (e.g., Miklósi et al., 1998) behaviors towards 
humans. Dogs seem to interpret a test situation as a form of 
communication or social game (Soproni et al., 2001), especially 
when the human experimenter uses ostensive cues (Kubinyi 
et  al., 2003; Topál et  al., 2009; Téglás et  al., 2012; Wallis et  al., 
2015). And, like children, they attend more to those humans 
with whom they also had a close relationship (Horn et al., 2013).
In a follow-up study, we  tested the hypothesis that dogs 
are more inclined to copy irrelevant actions if shown by the 
affiliated caregiver rather than by an unfamiliar person. By 
faithfully replicating Huber et  al. (2018), using the identical 
methods and procedures, but only substituting an unfamiliar 
person for the dog owner as the demonstrator, we  found a 
measurable decrease in the number of dogs that copied the 
irrelevant action (Huber et al., 2020). This finding thus confirmed 
our hypothesis that overimitation is facilitated by the affiliative 
relationship between the human demonstrator and the imitating 
dog, satisfying social motivations. Family dogs may repeat the 
actions of the human partner either because they want to 
please their caregiver or because they are inclined to obey by 
following tacit commands. While the first is clearly a positive 
characteristic of the dog–human relationship, the second one 
is ambiguous, although the two are linked. However, it is also 
possible – although difficult to prove – that the dogs overimitate 
because they want to be  part of our social game, meaning 
that they want to be  included in the social interaction that 
is happening. This interpretation is based on the assumption 
that they could have a social motivation to affiliate with the 
model and want to “be like the model” – as has been proposed 
in the case of humans to explain their readiness to overimitate 
(Nielsen, 2006; Keupp et  al., 2013, 393). Here, to “be like the 
other” could mean that the dogs want to behave like the other 
and be with the other. This explanation is compatible with 
the existence of an urge to please the caregiver or an inclination 
to obey. The intention to preserve and foster the bond between 
human and dog, however, may be  in itself a motivation behind 
this behavior. A dog might furthermore trust her caregiver in 
such a profound way that she sticks to whatever the caregiver 
proposes, at least for a while. Thus, it takes her some time 
to detach from the caregiver’s irrelevant strategy and come 
up with a more efficient one herself. In a team that is usually 
built on trust and affiliation this makes sense as a social strategy. 
It is surely difficult to test for such explanations based on 
trust or affiliation, but that should not be  a reason to rule 
them out right from the beginning. Complex social motivations 
in animals are clearly getting increased attention from empirical 
research lately. Disentangling the affiliative bonds between dogs 
and their caregivers, their scope and meaning, is one of the 
big challenges we  face.
Cumulating evidence suggests that the relationship between 
companion dogs and their human caregivers bears a remarkable 
resemblance to the parent-infant attachment bond (Archer, 1997; 
Topál et  al., 1998; Gácsi et  al., 2001; Prato-Previde et  al., 2003; 
Hare and Tomasello, 2005; Prato-Previde and Valsecchi, 2014). 
This affiliative bond changes dogs’ behavior in multiple ways. 
It enables dogs to engage their caregiver’s caregiving system, 
and it affects the way the dog explores objects and performs 
in cognitive tasks (Horn et  al., 2012, 2013). Like in children, 
the bond not only changes the dog’s general attitudes towards 
humans, it is also selective. For instance, dogs pay more attention 
to the actions of their caregivers than to the actions of other 
familiar humans (Horn et  al., 2013). And again, like in the 
case of the human parent–infant bond, the quality of the bond 
has strong influences on all these changes just mentioned 
(Myers, 1984; Ainsworth, 1989).
Taken together, these findings show that dogs pay close 
attention, not only to the emotions and gestures of humans, 
but also to their actions. They even overimitate, thus showing 
a specific copying style that is believed to be  a crucial feature 
of cumulative human culture. Overimitation in dogs is another 
strong sign for how deeply they attend to humans, especially 
to those with whom they have close relationships. The bond 
(which is selective) and the quality of the bond are of great 
importance for dogs’ general attitude towards humans and their 
behavioral performance. This can be nicely seen in family dogs 
interacting with their caregivers. Why dogs attend so closely 
to the behavior of their caregivers can be explained by different 
reasons: they surely want to please them and are inclined to 
obey them. However, they might also understand themselves 
as partners in our social interactions and are part in our 
social game. Bonding and affiliation are to be  understood as 
motivations for social interaction. Humans make ample use 
of the dogs’ readiness to understand their actions: dogs are 
trained in many different ways and for many different reasons, 
including agility training, obedience training, and other forms 
of special-purpose training, in which a precise following of 
the trainer’s behavior is the rule (Clark and Boyer, 1993).
Moral Emotions? From Biology to Philosophy
Dogs are deeply entrenched in interactions with humans, for 
which they are equipped with outstanding skills to understand 
human emotions, gestures, and actions. They form cooperative 
teams with us (e.g., as assistance, rescue, or herding dogs), 
they engage with us as communicative partners, and they have 
been enculturated in our society and are clearly part of our 
social game. Bonds between humans and dogs can be  very 
intense and even resemble parent–infant attachment bonds. It 
seems to be  this specific relationship of shared understanding 
and close affiliation that is at the heart of the view that dogs 
are indeed humans’ best friend.
Besides the capacities we  mentioned there might be  other, 
social and cognitive abilities in dogs, some of which we  do 
not know much about so far. Possible candidates for such 
capacities could be  empathy, guilt, or jealousy.
Empathy can be  understood, following de Waal’s Russian 
doll model, as an umbrella term that covers all those ways 
in which one can be affected by others’ emotions. The capacity 
for emotional contagion lies at its core, and outer layers of 
this “Russian doll” can incorporate more cognitively demanding 
capacities, such as theory of mind, perspective-taking, and 
sympathetic concern (e.g., de Waal, 2008). While the available 
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evidence suggests that dogs are capable of emotional contagion 
(Sümegi et  al., 2014; Yong and Ruffman, 2014; Palagi et  al., 
2015; Quervel-Chaumette et al., 2016; Huber et al., 2017; Bourg 
et  al., 2020), researchers are still on the look-out for empathy-
based complex behavior. First results indicate, for example, 
that there is “empathetically-motivated prosocial helping in 
dogs” and that dogs “are most likely to provide help to a 
human in need if they are able to focus on the human’s need 
instead of their own personal distress” (Sanford et  al., 2018, 
386). However, such results stand against mixed evidence on 
dogs’ helping behavior and against the need to clarify the 
underlying emotions and motivations (see e.g., Macpherson 
and Roberts, 2006, or the discussions in Sanford et  al., 2018 
and Adriaense et  al., 2020). Because empathy could motivate 
moral behavior like helping, philosophers of animal minds 
and animal ethicists discuss it as a moral emotion that 
animals could possess (Rowlands, 2012; Monsó, 2015, 2017; 
Monsó et  al., 2018; Benz-Schwarzburg et  al., 2019).
Two other interesting candidates for moral motivations that 
could also shape the social interactions and relationships between 
dogs and humans are guilt (see e.g., Tangney et  al., 2007; 
Prinz and Nichols, 2010) and jealousy (see e.g., Fredericks, 
2012; Kristjánsson, 2015). However, the evidence here is 
ambiguous or non-existent. There is to our knowledge not a 
single paper that provides strong empirical evidence of dogs 
feeling guilty. On the contrary, preliminary evidence suggests 
that dogs are not capable of guilt, despite many owners’ 
perception to the contrary (Horowitz, 2009; Hecht et  al., 2012; 
Ostojić et  al., 2015). Owners indeed often interpret their dogs’ 
behavior as guilt (Hecht et  al., 2012), something that can 
be  ethically problematic: “Failure to read these gestures for 
what they are, or even worse, misinterpreting gestures of 
appeasement as a sign of the dog feeling guilty, are likely to 
lead to inappropriate responses on the part of the human in 
the situation and hence lead to escalation of the behavior 
resulting in lunging, snapping, and/or biting” (Mills et  al., 
2014). The case of jealousy is similar. We  are just starting to 
investigate this emotion in dogs and face a limited body of 
research results. Interesting insights were reported by Harris 
and Prouvost (2014) who believe that at least some “primordial” 
form of jealousy, which we  know from human infants, occurs 
in dogs as well, or from Cook et  al. (2018) who investigate 
jealousy in dogs via fMRI methods. However, the results are 
heavily debated (see e.g., Vonk, 2018).
Interest in the named abilities in animals is rising among 
philosophers. This is at least partly because the presence of 
moral emotions in animals would mean that animals qualify 
as moral subjects, that is, individuals who sometimes behave 
on the basis of moral motivations (Rowlands, 2012). Moral 
emotions thus mark a minimal form of animal morality. This 
is ethically important. Indeed, it has been argued that minimal 
morality gives us a reason to owe these animals a special 
moral consideration, one that goes beyond the welfare approach 
that we  so often use to evaluate our treatment of animals, 
be  it pigs or dogs, cows, or any other non-human species 
(Monsó et al., 2018; Nawroth et al., 2019). If animals are moral 
subjects, profound ethical implications could follow, for example 
in the shape of animal rights (Rowlands, 2012), something 
we  have already seen defended in ethical debates surrounding 
great apes (see e.g., Andrews et  al., 2018). However, capacities 
such as empathy, guilt, or jealousy are very difficult to define 
conceptually (from a philosophical as well as a biological 
perspective). This is the case even if researchers pay much 
attention to them, as can be  seen in the case of empathy, of 
which it has been said that “there are probably nearly as many 
definitions … as people working on the topic” (de Vignemont 
and Singer, 2006, 435). Adriaense et  al. (2020, 62) conclude 
that we still face the challenge here of “closing the gap between 
theoretical concepts and empirical evidence.” The emotions of 
guilt and jealousy face similar definitional problems that will 
surface more and more when research into them proceeds.
Research into moral emotions and other social phenomena 
in dogs will surely add to our understanding of their perception 
and behavior in the future. Perhaps we  should err on the side 
of caution and assume that dogs are indeed moral subjects. 
However, based on the current state of the evidence we cannot 
make conclusive claims, yet. In addition, the discussion still 
needs conceptual input, and so we call here for interdisciplinary 
research on this topic. While embarking on this challenge, 
we  should constantly re-evaluate how far our ethical thinking 
leads us with reference to less controversial research results, 
as well as maintain an open mind towards challenging inherited 
definitions of different capacities when there are good conceptual 
reasons to do so. After all, the philosophical debate on social 
capacities in animals increasingly leans towards de-intellectualized 
accounts of such abilities in animals, including moral abilities 
(Rowlands, 2012; Monsó, 2015) and towards an investigation 
into their ethical relevance (Monsó et al., 2018; Benz-Schwarzburg 
et  al., 2019). In any case, our point in the following section 
is that we  already face good reasons to arrive at a more 
profound ethical consideration of dogs than we  often grant 
them. We  will settle with the kind of ethical implications that 
we can derive safely by focusing on the kind of research results 
summarized in sections “Understanding Human Emotions: How 
Dogs Read Our Faces and Listen to Our Voices,  Understanding 
Human Gestures: How Dogs Learn  to Cooperate, and 
Understanding Human Actions: How Dogs Learn Our Social 
Game”. We  believe that the mentioned capacities suffice to 
argue that dogs have a profound understanding of human 
gestures, actions and emotions. They clearly bond with us and 
enter into relationships of mutual understanding and meaningful 
interaction. Such relationships have repeatedly been described 
as characterized by attachment and close bonds. Let us build 
an ethical argument on that.
CHARACTERIZING THE HUMAN–DOG 
RELATIONSHIP: ETHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES
Until now, we  have very much emphasized a positive outlook 
on the human–dog relationship. It would be  a one-eyed view 
if we  would only mention the obviously positive aspects. For 
any ethical discussion concerning pet dogs we need to understand 
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that, on top of the affiliative motive, the behavior of these 
animals vis-à-vis their caregiver is also determined by their 
dependency on us and thus on educational and normative 
influences that need to be examined carefully. In the household, 
humans educate the dog regarding what to do and what not 
to do, involving actions that are far from causally transparent, 
and may be purely arbitrary or – even less positively – exclusively 
human-centered. In dog training, for example, a precise following 
of the trainer’s orders, commands, or behavior is the rule – 
and in fact expected from the dog, independently of the bonds 
at play, no matter what the dog’s own preferences for some 
humans over others are, and irrespective of the dog’s own 
intentions and desires. Are not there a lot of ethical challenges 
involved in the fact that dogs are so much part of the 
human world?
In what follows, we  will engage in a brief ethical discussion 
of the human-dog relationship. As a necessary first step, we will 
characterize the human-dog relationship as one in which there 
is a necessary power imbalance, where one of the partners is 
always more powerful than the other. Following that, we  will 
give an overview of the ethical responsibilities that arise out 
of this inequality when we  consider it in connection to how 
dogs perceive us and to the pervasive influence that we  can 
have on their character and capabilities. The owner or caregiver 
has certain duties, we  will argue, that go beyond ensuring an 
adequate welfare of their pet.
The Human-Dog Relationship as a 
Power-Relation
Ethicists have argued that the human–dog relationship oscillates 
between two extremes: dogs, like other companion animals, are 
at the same time “pampered” and “enslaved,” something that 
constitutes a “moral dilemma” (Irvine, 2004). “Enslaved” in this 
instance is to be  understood as a philosophical term, coming 
from an ethical approach that departs from the fact that companion 
animals exist for human purposes and are defined by the law 
as our property (Irvine, 2004, 5). We  can add aspects of 
dominance, ranging from a restriction in personal freedom 
(covering all aspects of a dog’s life, like feeding regimes, mating 
choices, or neutering policies) to forms of labor (like the use 
of dogs as sheep-herding, guiding, sniffing or rescuing staff). 
Most importantly, it is questionable whether dogs give in any 
form their free and informed consent to fulfill the tasks we assign 
to them. Dogs are clearly capable of cooperating with humans 
(skills-wise) and often happily seem to do so. But freedom 
(even in a minimal sense) is about opportunities and choices, 
and how much of these do they have? As we  are talking about 
an animal that is very much dependent on her caregiver’s choices 
and who is being purposefully bred as well as (often quite 
heavily) trained to fulfill certain human-oriented tasks, the 
question seems warranted (Cochrane, 2009, 2012; Schmidt, 2015).
Thereby, it seems possible, and even morally desirable, to 
grant an animal more choices and thus more freedom. Yeates 
(2015, 168) identifies a range of situations where we  should 
from a normative perspective respect the animal’s choice. These 
are for example situations in which we ourselves lack “accurate 
knowledge of the animal’s subjective experiences,” or in which 
we  do “not know what will lead to desirable experiences or 
allow for the avoidance of undesirable ones,” when we  are 
“biased” or “less aware of the animal’s specific situation.” 
He  argues, furthermore, that we  should better turn to respect 
the animal’s choice when we  ourselves “cannot appreciate all 
elements comprehensively, including considering any value to 
the animal being allowed to make and implement a choice, 
such as where a lack of control or liberty would be  unpleasant 
or where an animal would usefully learn from the process of 
choice-making.” Such an approach ultimately aims to reduce 
the power hierarchy and “set up situations that empower 
animals” to make their own choices.
Up to now, the high amount of paternalism and training 
involved in the human–dog relationship gives rise to a clear 
power relation. For sure, more and more trainers adopt training 
methods that turn away from a behavioristic understanding 
and work in a scientifically informed manner. But the many 
different perspectives on suitable training methods and the many 
noncertified methods and noncertified institutions in the dog 
training business lead to much diversity in the field. Thus, even 
though the field has moved forward in the past few years, it 
seems difficult to assess how scientifically informed the majority 
of trainers (let alone owners) actually treats and trains their 
dogs. Also, some dog trainers with massive public outreach 
even add on the mentioned questionable understanding by 
arguing that all dog training is ultimately about teaching the 
dog that the human is pack leader. Cesar Milan, one of the 
most influential and controversial dog trainers, describes “Pack 
Leadership” as a core principle of his training strategy, to 
be  applied in the following way: “Establish your position as 
pack leader by asking your dog to work. Take him on a walk 
before you  feed him. And just as you  do not give affection 
unless your dog is in a calm-submissive state, do not give food 
until your dog acts calm and submissive” (Milan, 2019). Still, 
even without such an idea of discipline and submission, other 
forms of dog training based on purely positive reinforcement 
also resort to methods that heavily impact on the dog’s will, 
her choices, preferences, and intentions. Some methods tie almost 
all feeding to training steps by reinforcing every positive behavior 
with food, sometimes while putting the dog otherwise on food 
deprivation. Lindsay describes in his Handbook of Applied Dog 
Behavior and Training that training only works if the animal 
is “in a state of need” that can be  satisfied only after the dog 
behaves in a “predetermined way.” Therefore, “combining food 
deprivation together with the presentation of special treats 
produces the best training results. The term deprivation means 
scheduling training sessions before meals rather than after them. 
The meal itself can be  given to reinforce the overall training 
session as a sort of jackpot” (Lindsay, 2000, 249).
We have come across a substantial reinterpretation of 
affection as something that is not given to the dog “unless 
the dog is in a calm-submissive state” in Milan’s (2019) training 
procedure and another substantial reinterpretation of feeding 
the dog in the sense that meals become a “sort of jackpot” 
in classical, modern reinforcement training. These narratives 
are normatively relevant because they show the tight 
entanglement of power, predetermination, and submission in 
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dog training, expressed by a language in which dogs “work” 
for us. No matter the method, all training ultimately educates 
the dogs into a human world with the aim that they function 
properly, that is, according to valued and dis-valued behavior 
in this setting: they are not supposed to chew on our furniture, 
pee on our carpet, or chase the neighbor’s cat. Spaces where 
a dog can, for example, run free without a muzzle or leash 
and interact with other dogs are clearly restricted as well as 
rare, at least in urban settings, where numbers of dogs have 
been increasing dramatically over the past decades, standing 
currently at well over 60 million in the United  States alone 
(American Pet Products Manufacturers Association, 2020).
We are aware that this understanding draws a rather sobering 
picture of the often romanticized human-dog relationship. 
However, pet keeping is not a given or simply a result of a 
natural affinity between humans and animals. It is a historically 
contingent practice that has also been circumscribed by social 
class and gender constructs (Irvine, 2004, 19). This is a 
sociological point that links with ethical and biological 
perspectives: like all our relationships with companion animals, 
the human-dog relationship depends on how we define animals, 
and for that our knowledge about their abilities and needs 
seems crucial. For sure, it is also crucial how ready we  are 
to take their perspective into consideration. For this, questions 
of power and hierarchy are relevant.
So let us start from the premise that the human-dog 
relationship can be  described as a human-dominated power 
relation in which dogs often have little choices and humans 
perceive themselves on a spectrum between guardians and 
leader of the pack. Given this power relation at place, and 
given a generalized lack of awareness of the latest research 
on dog social cognition, humans tend to interpret 
communicational misunderstandings as problems of the dog 
(e.g., in the sense of non-obedience). They consequently tend 
to interpret the behavioral reactions of the dog to such 
miscommunication not as a result of miscommunication (for 
which they themselves are also co-responsible) but again as 
a problem of the dog, who is, for example, claimed to 
be aggressive. Humans need to take responsibility here. We are 
left with the necessity to better understand how dogs perceive 
us and what they are capable of. Our summary of the socio-
cognitive abilities of dogs only shows the tip of the iceberg 
of what these animals can do. We  should not forget that they 
are quite different from ourselves with respect to their perceptual 
repertoire: humans, other than dogs,3 rely much more on vision, 
are relatively insensitive to odors, and so forth. Taking our 
visual perceptions, our facial expressions, and our emotions 
and actions into account to the extent dogs obviously do, 
renders their social life rather complicated. Living in a human’s 
world can thus be  very demanding for dogs and some dogs 
might be overwhelmed. It is our responsibility to gain awareness 
of the challenges we  face them with.
3 Dog’s sensitivity to odors allows humans to train them as sniffer dogs for all 
sorts of purposes, from finding substances, like marihuana or explosives, to 
discovering injured persons after earthquakes, from detecting illnesses, like 
cancer, to helping out in species conservation (see Fischer-Tenhagen et al., 2017).
In addition, we  need to deepen our understanding of the 
kind of relationship we  offer them and the power relations 
characterizing it. Here too, gaining awareness means shifting 
the focus from the dog to the human, and consequently taking 
responsibility. We  need to arrive at a better understanding of 
the range of concrete duties dog owners have. In what follows, 
we  will argue that humans are to a large degree responsible 
for who their dog turns out to be  and that they have a duty 
to ensure her adequate flourishing. Not only this, the 
characteristics of the human-dog relationship point to a 
propensity towards trust on behalf of the dog, and consequently 
entail a duty not to betray that trust.
The Duties of Dog Caregivers
In animal ethics, there is a generalized agreement that humans 
have negative duties towards (at least some) animals. Negative 
duties refer to duties not to cause unjustified harm, a position 
that can be  defended from a number of ethical theories, 
including utilitarianism (Singer, 2009), deontology (Regan, 
2004), and virtue ethics (Hursthouse, 2011). However, negative 
duties do not exhaust all that morality demands from us. In 
human-human relationships, we  are also often required to 
assist someone in need, even if we  are not responsible for 
their harm. For instance, if we  witness someone falling onto 
the train tracks at an underground station, we  are morally 
required to do our best to save them, even though their peril 
is not our own fault. These are known as positive duties. In 
those cases, in which there is a pre-existing special relationship, 
these positive duties are even stronger. Parents are not only 
required not to harm their children and to assist them when 
they are in need, they are also required to do all that is in 
their power to ensure that they have a good life. This means 
providing them with food and healthcare, but also ensuring 
that they receive a proper education, that they have opportunities 
for exercising their creativity and making friends, that they 
feel loved and cared for, and so on. In short, that they flourish 
as the sort of beings they are. Rowlands (2012) considers 
that this treatment is owed as a matter of respect: “to respect 
an individual is, fundamentally, to respect it as the kind of 
individual it is” (Rowlands, 2012, 249). If, indeed, the dog-human 
relationship entails forms of attachment that resemble our 
bonds with human children, the question then arises: what 
would respecting our dogs as the kinds of beings they are 
look like?
Palmer (2010) has argued that when considering the duties 
that we  owe to other animals, we  cannot follow a one-size-
fits-all logic, even in those cases where different species have 
similar cognitive capacities. She argues that the surrounding 
context, the history, and the pre-existing relation are fundamental 
in determining the kinds of duties that we  owe to a particular 
animal. With regards to those animals who live independently 
from us in the wild, we  only have negative duties not to harm 
them. In contrast, those animals with whom we  have some 
sort of special relationship will, in addition, generate positive 
duties. If we  consider the case of dogs, this is clearly going 
to be  one of the most demanding human–animal relations 
from a moral perspective. As we  have already discussed, dogs 
Benz-Schwarzburg et al. How Dogs Perceive Humans
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 December 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 584037
are the oldest domesticated species. This history has generated 
a very high degree of vulnerability and dependency in those 
dogs that live in our households. They depend on us for food, 
shelter, and medical care. Indeed, they depend on us for sheer 
survival. As we  have seen, dogs also have a highly malleable 
nature and we  can shape their character to a large degree. 
Dogs play very little part in choosing their caregiver, and still 
the person they end up with will have a profound influence 
on their life and on the sort of individual they turn out to 
be. So, they also depend on us to a much deeper level. This, 
coupled with the aforementioned power relation, generates 
positive duties that go beyond simply ensuring that the dogs 
in our household have a good welfare.
We are responsible for our dogs’ lives from beginning to 
end, and this means that we  will have an immense causal 
influence on the quality that their life ultimately has. This 
generates a duty to ensure that our dogs lead a good life. But 
what does it mean for a life to be good? Different philosophical 
traditions have offered different answers to this question (for 
an overview of these different theories see Crisp, 2017). From 
the perspective of a common theory known as hedonism, a 
good life is one in which there is, overall, more positive 
subjective experiences than negative subjective experiences. For 
a dog this might mean a life in which she is in general happy 
and has very few painful or fearful experiences. From the 
perspective of desire-satisfaction theories, in contrast, a life is 
good if the individual’s most important desires are fulfilled. 
For a dog, this could mean a life in which she gets to do all 
the things that she really cares about. We  believe that neither 
of these two options gives a satisfactory account of what it 
would mean for a dog to have a good life.
It is easy to see why the desire-satisfaction account of a 
good life is not adequate, at least in the case of dogs. This 
is due to the mismatch between their biological roots as 
wolves and the fact that they have been domesticated. This 
history has led to a situation in which, firstly, not all the 
desires that dogs have are actually good for them. For instance, 
many dogs, if let by their caregivers, will eat much more 
than they actually need, and consequently develop different 
health problems in the long run. The tendency to eat more 
than needed might be  good for a carnivore who lives in the 
wild and does not get to eat very often, but for a pet in a 
household with unlimited access to food, it can significantly 
worsen her quality of life. Secondly, it is not just important 
to determine what dogs desire, but also what are the reasons 
behind those desires. As we  saw before, dogs are very often 
eager to cooperate with humans, but it is difficult to see 
what the exact motivation behind this eagerness is: Is it the 
expectation of a reward? Is it fear of punishment?, or Is it 
a desire to please the caregiver or a desire to be  part of the 
social game? The history of domestication has also led to 
dogs being shaped to be  eager to cooperate with us. In this 
sense, many of their desires are the result of a process of 
selective breeding that could be  comparable to a process of 
indoctrination in humans. Therefore, from the fact that a 
dog has a desire, the conclusion that it is good to satisfy 
this desire does not automatically follow.
Desire-satisfaction theories thus cannot provide us with a 
satisfactory account of what it means for a dog to lead a 
good life. But what about hedonism? Surely a life in which 
a dog is overall happy is a good life for that dog? We  believe 
that hedonism, just like desire-satisfaction theories, captures 
an important aspect of what it means to lead a good life, but 
cannot give us the full story. In philosophical terms, having 
more positive than negative subjective experiences throughout 
one’s lifetime is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a 
good life. Imagine a dog, we can call her Frida, whose caregiver 
decides to keep her inside the house her whole life to protect 
her from possible dangers and fearful stimuli she might encounter 
outside. Frida is provided with an adequate diet, a comfortable 
bed in which she can rest, and enough toys to keep her 
entertained. The extremely controlled environment she is kept 
in ensures that she very rarely experiences any accidents or 
illnesses, stress or pain. If we  look at Frida’s life as a whole, 
we will see that she is extremely pampered, to say it in Irvine’s 
words, and overall happy. But is this a good life?
We believe that Frida’s life, while certainly far from terrible, 
is not a good life. This has to do with the fact that, by not 
being allowed to encounter challenges, to interact with con- 
and heterospecifics, and to explore the outside world, Frida 
is prevented from flourishing as the type of being that she 
is. As we saw in the previous sections, dogs have many amazing 
socio-cognitive skills but these are largely dependent on how 
we  have shaped them during domestication and what they 
learn from interactions with humans during ontogeny. We believe 
that caregivers have a positive duty to ensure that these 
capabilities can develop, not only so that the animals can 
better cope with the challenges they might encounter in their 
lives, but also because it is a good thing for them to be allowed 
to flourish as the type of being they are, an idea that can 
be  captured, for instance, using the capabilities approach 
(Nussbaum, 2007; Monsó et  al., 2018).4 Allowing for the dogs 
in our care to develop their socio-cognitive skills also enables 
them to have a life that is more meaningful. According to 
Purves and Delon (2018), animals’ lives acquire meaning when 
they are allowed to exercise their agency and use it to bring 
valuable states of affairs to the world. These valuable states of 
affairs range from relatively simple endeavors like rearing their 
young or establishing friendships, to more demanding behaviors 
like rescuing a human in need (which recent research shows 
dogs are capable of; Bourg et  al., 2020). A dog who is allowed 
to flourish to her full capacity is more likely to lead a meaningful 
life, which will in turn be  a better life.
In addition to the duty to ensure the flourishing of the 
dogs under our care, there is also an additional duty that 
emerges from the special relationship that we  have towards 
4 One could object that the fact that dogs share an environment with us gives 
us a reason to restrict their freedom. However, it is important to remember 
that dogs did not choose to share an environment with us. If we  were to 
hold a human captive in our household, it would surely be  very problematic 
to claim that this ‘shared environment’ gives us a reason to restrict her freedom. 
On the contrary, the existence of a shared environment gives us a reason to 
respect others’ freedom and interests, as has been long defended within social 
contract theory.
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dogs, and from the specific way in which dogs perceive us. 
In our review of the empirical evidence regarding dogs’ perception 
of humans, we  have highlighted the special characteristics of 
the dog–human bond. Dogs are not only eager to cooperate 
with us; they are also attuned to us like no other species. 
Their tendency to overimitate humans, for instance, points to 
a perception of us as important social partners. We  know that 
dogs can recognize individual humans and they are also 
significantly less fearful of us than are their wild ancestors. All 
of this points to the ease with which a relationship of trust 
among dogs and their caregivers can emerge. Placing your trust 
in another allows for significant social bonds to be  built, but 
it also means that one is made more vulnerable. The moral 
importance of this was captured by Cooke, who wrote that 
“[i]n trusting another, we  give them power over us, power to 
set back our projects, exploit us, and make us vulnerable not 
just to them, but to others also” (Cooke, 2019, 188)5. The trust 
that dogs place in us is no coincidence; instead it is a result 
of the process of domestication of which we  are at least partly 
responsible as well as a result of what they learn in interactions 
with us during their lives. Humans thus have a duty to live 
up to this trust (see similarly Hens, 2008), to ensure that our 
dogs’ needs are met, and that they are not placed in a situation 
where it would be  warranted for them to feel betrayed. To 
paraphrase Cooke (2019, 198), humans have a duty to act in 
ways that make them worthy of the trust that dogs place in 
them. For this duty to exist, it is not necessary for dogs to 
possess a cognitively complex form of trust for which we  do 
not have any empirical evidence, yet. Our argument is that 
the way dogs engage with us evidences a trusting relationship 
that gives rise to duties on our side (not on theirs). For the 
kind of trust we  are after we  do not need the dog as a moral 
agent to fully understand what trust is in a normative sense, 
nor do we  need the dog to understand duties on her side. 
Dogs’ capacity to enter into such relationships with us is 
independent of the question of whether they have (in addition) 
the sort of capacity for full-blown moral judgment that orthodox 
frameworks of moral agency require, or even a simple explicit 
motivation to trust their owner (which could make them a 
moral subject in Rowland’s sense). At least the former, intellectually 
demanding forms of trust might be  tied to other complex 
abilities, such as a theory of mind. Our point is humbler here 
but still of profound relevance: the kind of trust we  identify 
in the human-dog relationship becomes an ethical signpost in 
the light of the dog’s dependency on her caretaker.
CONCLUSION
Dogs have indeed special skills to understand and interact 
with humans due to the evolutionary history and domestication 
of the species and due to complex competences acquired by 
5 Note that Cooke’s theory does not require any sort of cognitive notion of 
trust as a capacity dogs have. Instead, we  would argue, trust emerges as a 
disposition in dogs, as a result of their phylogenetic and ontogenetic makeup 
and it is necessary to enter into a relationship of mutual understanding and 
social dependency.
individual and social learning. We  see accumulating evidence 
of their understanding of human emotions, gestures, and actions 
and of how much they are thus part of human culture and 
our social game. Bonds between dogs and humans are selective, 
intense, and vary in quality. Affiliation plays a motivational 
role in dog behavior and shapes the dogs’ attitudes as well 
as their interaction with humans. All of this, however, has to 
be  seen in the light of a comprehensive characterization of 
the human-dog relationship, which is a socially constructed 
practice with clear power relations. We  have argued that the 
human-dog relationship is a dominance relationship where 
humans are usually in command of power. If caregivers are 
unaware about how much their dogs pay attention to subtle 
communicative cues and how much they understand about as 
well as attend to their caregivers’ emotions, gestures, and actions, 
a range of conflicts can arise. Instead we  should invest into 
building relationships of trust with dogs that live up to ideas 
of companionship.
Irvine (2004) arrived at the conclusion that “relationships 
between humans and animals have depended on how a given 
society defines animals and what it means to associate with 
them”. She argues that “what we currently know about animals 
demands wrestling with the moral implications of keeping them 
as pets” (Irvine, 2004, 5). We  have been following this critical 
view of pet keeping in general and dog keeping in specific, 
because it could serve as a helpful heuristic to map out problems 
that are often overlooked, specifically problems that point 
beyond welfare towards other normative concepts. Sixteen years 
after Irvine’s paper we face a substantial amount of new research 
results on dog social cognition which we  have summarized 
in this paper and which we  need to take into account when 
debating the human-dog relationship today.
From what we have discussed we gain a better understanding 
of a main characteristic of the human-dog relationship that 
lies in its dichotomy between special attachment as well 
as special understanding on the one hand and the 
instrumentalization of dogs on the other hand. Against this 
backdrop, a meaningful social interaction between dogs and 
caregivers remains a fragile construct. In order to treat dogs 
in the way that morality requires of us, it is paramount that 
we  bear in mind the spectrum of positive duties that this 
relationship engenders, including the duty to live up to the 
trust that dogs place in us.
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